INTRODUCTION
Some questions seem to need no thought at all. Secrecy or openness? Lies or truth? In each instance, one answer seems obvious, the other repellent. More than this, a straight, to-thepoint answer seems the only sensible choice. Why complicate the questions? To do so would raise the spectre of the Secret State;
1 it might also stymie moves towards 'open' science and
give succour to practices of commercial confidentiality that harm life and health.
Other questions, by contrast, seem to need far too much thought. Most of us duck and dodge these, but some cleave to certainties even in the face of paradox, a plurality of views and potentially profound consequences. Family life, as many have pointed out, often throws up questions of this second sort. Take the duo with which we started: 'secrecy or openness?'
and 'lies or truth?' They seemed straightforward questions, but change the context to a family makers and stimulating debate in bioethics'. 5 In April 2013 it published a report-'Donor Conception: Ethical Aspects of Information Sharing' 6 -that, for us, lives up to this reputation. Produced by a small, expert working party in a process involving consultation and fact-finding, the Report considers the impact of the disclosure/non-disclosure of information about genetic origin in families created in the UK through assisted reproduction using donor gametes. In line with its Terms of Reference, the Report pays particular attention to four matters: first, the range of stakeholders involved, the complexity of the relationships between them and the ethical values at stake; second, the quality of the evidence currently available;
third, the support available to both donors and donor-conceived families; and finally, the role of law and professional guidance in determining the provision of information, and in intervening in donor-conceived families' decisions with respect to disclosure.
In this paper, we summarise the Report. We also comment on it. There is, we think, a lot to compliment: from the emphasis on kinship to the strong support for parents as decisionmakers, and the characterisation of donor-conception information as both personal and 'interpersonal'. There is also adroit handling of personal identity, in that the genetic dimension is acknowledged but not allowed to squeeze out other identity-crafting forces.
There is an invocation of 'the stewardship state' 7 that, to be honest, we find harder to assess.
But what interests us most of all is how rights are framed in the Report; we concentrate on this in section III below, where it will be the stepping-off point for a set of comments on bioethics, rights and human rights, and law. We begin however with some background. There are two other, rather clearer trends: one is the increasing use of CBRC by would-be parents who need donor gametes; the other is the child's 'right to know' movement.
Would-be parents from the UK report that the main reason they have been going abroad is the shortage of gametes here 'at home' 15 -a problem they associate with the change in the law.
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There was however a shortage before the removal of anonymity, and opinions differ as to whether it was the change in the law, an inefficient donor-recruitment policy, or both that exacerbated the supply problem. Amidst rising levels of concern, steps have been taken.
Permitted levels of compensation for donors have increased 17 and the HFEA has set up a National Donation Strategy Group, which brings together a wide range of experts to develop new approaches to raising awareness of donation. Whether such measures will increase supply, and in turn reduce CBRC, depends in part on the second trend we want to discuss: the child's 'right to know' movement. There is, to be clear, no right to know under UK law. The decision to disclose rests with parents and, as we explain below, the Council believes this should not change. Others, including The Children's Society, the British Association for Adoption and Fostering (BAAF), and the Project Group on Assisted Reproduction, British Association of Social Workers (PROGAR), take the opposite view. Indeed it was a call by The Children's Society for a change in the original HFE Act that prompted the government to launch the consultation that led to the abolition of full anonymity. More recently, PROGAR has been at the forefront of claims-making for further changes to the law. Its view is that donor-conceived children are the major stakeholders: thus, for PROGAR, 'the primary ethical concern is that [as the law stands] the welfare of those who are most likely to be affected, donor conceived offspring, is not afforded paramountcy'. 18 It wants a debate about retrospective disclosure of donors' identity and about a birth registration system that would ensure those who are donorconceived are alerted to their status and informed about how to retrieve 'their' information. It has also suggested that would-be parents should not be accepted for treatment if they state their intention to withhold information from any child who might be born.
Looked at more broadly, it seems that much of the claims-making for the child's 'right to know' emphasises one, some or all of the following: genetic background will become increasingly important for medical reasons; genealogical knowledge is also central to the development of personal identity; the position of donor-conceived people should be aligned more closely with that of adopted people; and the stigma around donor conception has faded. It is, in many ways, a 'modern' mix: it draws on rights thinking and on genetic in Strasbourg case-law on both paternity testing and the practice of anonymous birth, 21 and in provisions of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child which say that a child should be able to know her or his parents as far as possible.
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Making rights real, in law and in practice, is however no simple matter. The human rights non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and groups of experts who draw up and publicise sets of principles in particular areas (eg, sexual orientation and gender identity) will testify to how hard it is to turn such 'soft, soft law' into law. They will also testify to the ways that rights, even when they have the standing of 'real' or 'hard' law, generally ebb and flow.
Also, even the most strongly-worded rights 'in principle' are no guarantees of those rights 'in practice'. Moreover, as regards the donor-conceived child's 'right to know', genetic thinking seems just as complex as rights thinking (and the two are of course related in that, today, both human rights law-makers and claims-makers contribute to genetic thinking). Consider the following: as we noted earlier, the child's 'right to know' movement has sometimes drawn an analogy between donor conception and adoption. 23 UK scientists have pioneered research into variations of IVF procedures which include using part of a donated egg to replace the faulty mitochondria of the affected mother. Any resulting children from the therapy would be born with nuclear DNA from their parents' sperm and egg, and the egg donor's mitochondrial DNA.
The new techniques have already been considered by the Council; they have also been the subject of a public consultation by the HFEA. The Council's view is that the donor of mitochondria should not be given the same status in all aspects of regulation as a reproductive egg or embryo donor: for example, mDNA donors should not be mandatorily required to be identifiable to the individuals born from their donation. 24 Similarly, in the HFEA's public consultation a majority of participants felt that because the role of mitochondria is limited to energy production, the technique is more akin to 'tissue donation'; that mitochondrial replacement therapy was less likely to impact on a person's physical characteristics or identity; and that the resultant child did not need identifying information about the mitochondrial donor. 25 In summary, although both egg donation for reproductive purposes and egg donation for mitochondrial replacement assist procreation, it seems that more social meaning and relational responsibility are ascribed to the former. Accordingly, the resultant child's 'quest for identity' is perceived to be more relevant in egg donation. Because however this judgement is based at least in part on the number of genes that are transferred between the donor and the child's mother, it raises questions about where we are headed with 'genetic thinking'. Why is-and why should-numbers of genes be so significant?
II. THE REPORT
We turn now to the Council's Report. donor-conceived) and studies may suggest that both 'disclosing' and 'non-disclosing' families do well up to early adolescence, but there is-the Report says-'sufficient evidence to point to the conclusion that, other things being equal, it will usually be better for children to be told, by their parents and at an early age, that they are donor-conceived'. 34 considering this evidence. But the stewardship state should also be taking steps to encourage inclusivity: encouraging, in particular, the acceptance of diversity both in the way people become parents and in the plethora of ways in which they create kin. 40 This in turn will promote the well-being of those affected by donor conception.
A cluster of recommendations flow from these and other responsibilities outlined in the Report. Some concern medical information: one is that guidance on the screening and assessment of donors with respect to serious, strongly heritable conditions should be reviewed and updated; another is that there needs to be a clear mechanism to allow significant medical information that emerges after donation to be shared between donors and 
III. ANALYSIS
There is, for us, a great deal to admire about this Report. There is just one issue-the 'support, encourage and empower' ('SEE') actions expected of 'the stewardship state'-on 40 Report (n 6 above) paras 5.69-5.71. 41 ibid paras 6.21-6.22.
which we reserve judgement, and one decision-the framing of rights and the boxing-away of them that follows-with which we disagree. To be honest, we don't know what to make of the 'SEE-ing' state. The Report says very clearly that 'wherever possible, measures that aim to support, encourage and empower those making decisions are preferable (both ethically and practically) to measures that seek to limit or remove choice'. 42 It also says that the ethos within clinics should be non-judgmental. 43 Such comments suggest there is no reason to be concerned about the 'SEE-ing' state. Still, care will be needed in practice given that it is the state that is, for instance, encouraging past donors to come forward and 're-register' as identifiable donors, or encouraging prospective donors to bring their partners to counselling sessions. Care will also be essential vis-à-vis state engagement with prospective and recipient parents, and more broadly with diverse donor-conceived families. We say this in part because elsewhere measures in practice (notably, US abortion laws that feature information provision and a waiting period) can seem more about 'force' than about 'facilitation'.
If our position on 'facilitation' is blurry, we are, by contrast, quite certain that we disagree with the Report's handling of rights. To be precise: we agree that '[m]uch of the contemporary ethical and legal debate on information sharing in donor conception has been phrased in the language of rights' but we would not move from this to the argument that '[s]tarting from the language of rights, however, is effectively to start with conclusions: the conclusion that particular interests are of sufficient importance to impose duties on others to ensure that the right-holder is able to enjoy the interest in question'. 44 Nor would we have boxed-away rights in order to consider 'interests' and 'values' which in turn are weighed and 42 Report (n 6 above), executive summary, para 37. 43 ibid para 43. 44 Report (n 6 above) executive summary, paras 27-28. See further ch 5 of the Report.
balanced and give rise to 'responsibilities'. 45 Indeed, as we explain below, what we would like to see is the 'unboxing' of rights by the Council and by others too.
To be clear: we are not saying that rights-as law or, more broadly, as a mode of thinking, talking and claims-making-must govern disclosure in donor-conception families, kinship more generally or even report-writing by bioethical bodies such as the Council. It is just that we think it is a mistake to side-line them. The prospect of a mass 'giving-up' of rights is remote: recall Duncan Kennedy's pithy remark, '"Giving up" rights would be like a professional athlete giving up steroids when all his or her competitors are still wedded to them'. 46 True, there is no actual right to know in UK law and there is also a sense from, say, the Children Act 1989 that legally protected rights are not a good way to govern family life, but this is not the same as the 'giving-up' of rights. We say this for the simple reason that rights 'as law' are never the whole of rights: as Katie Young has emphasised one needs always to consider not just how rights are 'constitutionalised' but also how they are 'constituted'. 47 What she means is that the lived details of rights cannot be known from legal doctrine alone: how rights become law (or not), how they ebb and flow as law, and how their legal form translates into reality-and into personal identity-are part of the detail too.
Furthermore, even in terms of rights 'as law', if the Conservative party succeeds in its electoral ambition to 'scrap' the Human Rights Act 1998, there will still be legally-protected rights-it is only (European) human rights (notably the ECHR) that the party wants to cast aside. It is also worth noting that the party's views are not shared across the UK: Scotland 
